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Deleuze’s writings have been received as important antitheses to the
structuralist and psychoanalytic approaches to film studies of the 1970s
and 1980s, the kind of work made famous in Anglo-American film
studies by this journal. At one level, Deleuze was felt to have introduced
a perspective on film studies that was at odds with Screen Theory’s
insistence on the passivity of the cinema spectator, the latter being a
notion indebted to theories of psychoanalysis and articulated in various
ways by Christian Metz, Laura Mulvey, Stephen Heath, Peter Wollen,
Colin MacCabe, Jean-Louis Baudry and others (and not just in Screen,
but in also Film Quarterly, Afterimage and Camera Obscura). Rather
than spectators passively deprived of their bodies and held in thrall to an
ideological apparatus, Deleuze’s writings gave rise to the possibility of
spectators who engaged their bodies and senses in ways that made Screen
Theory seem incorrigibly shortsighted. And yet, if Deleuze seems to
offer something beyond the notion of a passive spectator, what kind of
spectator does he presume? Does Deleuze demonstrate some of the
active capabilities of the cinema spectator? Or, more pertinently, does
Deleuze even have a notion of a cinema spectator – a viewer or audience
member who watches and listens to a film – at all? Does he envisage
things called subjects which are engaged in a cinematic situation? These
are somewhat difficult questions, and if Deleuze has answers to them
they are not at all straightforward.
My aim here is to put forward a number of propositions on Deleuzian
spectatorship which might seem a little strange to some readers. These
propositions are made against the backdrop of Screen Theory. I make
them in order to foreground what is arguably essential to a Deleuzian

















conception of cinema spectatorship. Disconcerting for many readers
might be the fact that I consider Deleuze’s spectator to be one that
eschews activity – or, at least, for Deleuze the spectator is someone
whose circumstances are very much at odds with what film studies, in the
wake of Screen Theory, has defined as the activities of film viewing. In
short, I believe Deleuze’s spectator to be something which (or someone
who) is ineluctably passive; that this passivity signals something
definitively radical in Deleuze’s approach; and furthermore that this
conception of passive spectatorship allows some access to understanding
Deleuze’s overall project in the Cinema books.1 This might seem like a
lot to address in a short essay, but I hope if nothing else at least to chart
the course of some future research.
As I already noted, one way in which Deleuze has been taken up by
film studies is as a way of repudiating some aspects of Screen Theory.
Thus, for example, we have Steven Shaviro’s groundbreaking The
Cinematic Body, which uses Deleuzian philosophy to open up new
cinematic territories beyond the ocularcentric, psychoanalytically
focused discourses of Screen Theory.2 Arguing quite explicitly against
Screen Theory, Shaviro focuses on the cinematic realms of affective and
bodily sensation found in Deleuze’s works. Shaviro’s work is echoed in a
number of subsequent books – Barbara Kennedy’s Deleuze and Cinema,
Patricia Pisters’s The Matrix of Visual Culture, Laura Marks’s The Skin
of the Film – all of which foreground the body’s cinematic possibilities
by way of Deleuzian theory, as against the all-seeing, subject-centred
approaches of Screen Theory.3
However, the first point to be made about each of these books and their
focus on Deleuzian aspects of the cinematic body is that they in no way
stand as repudiations of the main tenets of Screen Theory. Screen Theory
was as set against ocularcentrism as it was against the notion of an
all-seeing, masterful subject. Put simply, the only reason Screen Theory
ever articulated a notion of passive spectatorship was in order to be
resoundingly critical of that passivity. Screen Theory was dedicated to
finding modes of audience engagement that were not passive; and thus if
Deleuzian approaches to cinema are critical of passive modes of
spectatorship in favour of ‘bodily’ modes of engagement, then they are
merely criticizing precisely the same things as the Screen theorists were.
Also, if Screen Theory did use psychoanalysis, then to some extent it did
so in order to invent ways of providing a cinematic body. As Stephen
Heath put it emphatically in his essay ‘Film performance’, at least one
aim of Screen Theory was to define a cinema that ‘makes a body’.4 So, a
first point, then, is to realize that much of the work on Deleuze that has
purported to redirect the debates that informed Screen Theory are not
really repositioning such debates. Instead, it is actually replaying those
debates. This is only a first point, however, for what is even more
intriguing about the work alluded to above is that it relies for the most
part on Deleuze’s non-cinematic writings. Instead of turning to his
Cinema books, this work tends to rely on the reformulations of
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psychoanalytic theory that Deleuze undertook with Fe´lix Guattari.5 It is
hard to understand quite why film scholars felt they could ditch – or at
least sidestep – Deleuze’s Cinema books in favour of his other
formulations.
Perhaps such research has avoided Deleuze’s Cinema books because
those books are exceptionally difficult, especially inasmuch as they
discard most of the language traditionally associated with film studies.
Deleuze simply ignores the language associated with Screen Theory:
suture, gaze, ideological apparatus, reality effect, and so on. Even the two
fine English-language exegeses of the Cinema books, by D.N. Rodowick
and Ronald Bogue, tend to remain reluctant to pull Deleuze’s
classifications into too close a contact with other strands of contemporary
film studies.6 Rodowick claims early in his book, for example, that
‘Rather than trying to incorporate Deleuze in the extant schemas for
understanding the historical development of anglophone film theory,
I believe that The Movement-Image and The Time-Image are more
productively read as a challenge to those schemas’.7
So Deleuze remains strangely out of position in mainstream film
studies. There is, I believe, a very specific reason for this: Deleuze has no
explicit conception of the cinema spectator. His discourses and
categories seem bereft of any thoughts about viewers, beholders or
audiences – the people who go to the cinema. When so much of the study
of cinema has been devoted to questions of spectators and audiences –
for Screen Theory, yes, but also for movements that have claimed to
supplant Screen Theory, such as cognitivism, cultural studies and the
various modes of reception theory – Deleuze’s failure to have a theory of
spectatorship places him quite simply out of the loop in the major
conversations of film studies. Nevertheless, I do believe an implicit
theory of spectatorship can be found in the Cinema books.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Deleuze’s spectator is that she/
he is passive in a way that even the worst excesses of Screen Theory
would never have dared consider. Screen Theory – generalizations are
necessary here – typically posited a distinction between two types of
cinematic engagement: one which was passive and another which was
active. Passive spectators were the products of mainstream, orthodox,
Hollywood cinema, while active spectators were the hoped-for products
of an avant-garde cinema. This formulation was indebted to Brecht, and
is one that remains somewhat in vogue even today. In one of Screen
Theory’s classic articles, an essay by Colin MacCabe on ‘The politics of
separation’, the words of Brecht are directly quoted, words which posit
the grave sin of a spectator’s fusion with the action of a play in a way that
served as a template for Screen Theory’s derision for the cinema
spectator’s fusion with the screen:
The process of fusion extends to the spectator who gets thrown into the
melting pot . . . and becomes a passive (suffering) part of the total work
of art. Witchcraft of this sort must, of course, be fought against. What
5 Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari,
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is intended to produce hypnosis, is likely to induce sordid intoxication,
or creates fog, has got to be given up.8
Passive spectators are emphatically what must be avoided, for such
spectators can only be the subjects of witchcraft and hypnosis. As an
antidote to this passive intoxication, the aim of a positive or progressive
cinema is one of an active spectatorship where spectators remain in
control of their senses and thoughts. Very few scholars in film studies
have ever defended a passive spectator, from the politically motivated
call for active responses to society’s contradictions, through David
Bordwell’s defence of the active cognitive activities of the beholder, to
cultural studies’ articulations of the complex interactions of which
viewers are capable.
What, then, is Deleuze’s spectator? First of all, Deleuze’s spectator
cannot be said to exist prior to a film. Rather, it is created almost entirely
by the film. There is no prior ‘subject’ to be posited as existing anterior to
the happening of the filmic event; or if there is, then this subjectivity is
thoroughly dismantled by the film that unfolds in front of this spectatorial
entity which, for all intents and purposes, is a ‘non-subject’.9 Deleuze’s
articulations of this position are somewhat obfuscatory, but they can be
found at the beginning of Cinema 1, where he pits the philosophy of
Henri Bergson against the conceptions of phenomenological philosophy.
He sums up the conflict by declaring that for phenomenology
consciousness is consciousness of something, whereas for Bergson
consciousness is something. Instead of consciousness being separated
from that of which it is conscious, Bergson, and Deleuze after him,
conceive of consciousness as something that is conjoined with those
somethings with which it comes into contact. Consciousness therefore
does not conceive of things by becoming conscious of them, but instead,
consciousness is itself formed by things.10
If we extend this understanding of consciousness to the cinema – as
Deleuze does – then our engagement with a film is not a process of
becoming conscious of what is happening in a film, but, rather, our
consciousness is formed by what happens in the film. (Another way of
expressing this problematic can be found in Deleuze’s claim that ‘the
brain is the screen’: ‘The circuits and linkages of the brain don’t preexist
the stimuli, corpuscles and particles [grains] that trace them’.11) All of
this is really one way of saying that, for Deleuze, the spectator is fused
with the film; there is no spectator who watches (and listens to) a film, for
the spectator is only ever formed by watching (and listening to) a film.
One might say that for Deleuze there are no subjects who go to the
cinema; the identities, backgrounds, tastes and predilections of those who
might presume to go to the cinema are irrelevant. Rather, there are only
subjectivities formed by the cinema, by the act of going to the cinema and
experiencing a film. This is indeed a process of fusion, a fusion between
spectator and screen, in the worst ways that Brecht or any Screen theorist
might have been able to imagine. From Deleuze’s point of view,
8 Quoted in Colin MacCabe, ‘The
politics of separation’, Screen, vol.
16, no. 4 (1975), p. 48.
9 Across the Cinema books Deleuze
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Two Regimes of Madness: Texts
and Interviews, 1975–1995
(New York, NY: Semiotext(e),
2006), p. 351.
10 See Deleuze, Cinema 1: the
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11 Gilles Deleuze, ‘The brain is the
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however, all of the negative terms employed by Brecht can be taken as
positives: cinema is a kind of witchcraft that induces hypnosis,
intoxication and fog. Quite contrary to Brecht and Screen Theory, these,
for Deleuze, are some of the positive things cinema can do.
One way to characterize broadly the difference between Screen
Theory and Deleuze’s approach to cinema is to see the difference as one
between theory and philosophy. The project of Screen Theory was
inspired by an Althusserian commitment to ‘Theory’ as that which
precedes and designates what any practice is capable of achieving.
Theory was therefore conceived as an essential ally of and precursor
to practice, so that the abiding aim of Screen Theory was to designate
the parameters of a new cinema, a cinema primarily based on the
experiments of the avant garde. In addition to this, for Screen Theory, the
invention of a new cinema was a necessary step in the invention of a new
society; a society which, by definition, would be composed of human
beings who could no longer be called ‘subjects’ (in the sense specifically
given to this term by Althusser).12 By contrast, Deleuze’s cinematic
philosophy is an attempt to chart some of the consequences to which
cinema has given rise. Those consequences are ‘blocs of sensations’13 –
something Deleuze ascribes generally to works of art – or, more
explicitly in the case of cinema, the determination to uncover the
‘unthought’ in thought (to think that which is unthinkable).14 For
Deleuze, such sensations or thoughts are not things that can be possessed
by or attributed to subjects, for they are, Deleuze writes (with Guattari),
‘independent of a state of those who experience them’.15 If the project of
Screen Theory was one of transforming subjectivities so that they would
no longer be subjects, then Deleuze’s cinematic philosophy is from the
beginning one which tries to go beyond subjectivity.
What can Deleuze hope to gain from such formulations; and,
furthermore, what can we hope to gain? When so much theorization in
the humanities has been predicated on finding ways in which viewers,
readers, beholders or listeners might critically analyze their own
responses to cultural objects or novels or paintings – that is, to engage
critically in reflective thought processes about the objects with which
they come into contact – what can it mean for Deleuze to promote such
thoroughly non-reflexive, passive, uncritical responsiveness? In order to
understand Deleuze’s intention, we need to make an important
distinction in the way we think about the spectator’s relationship to any
film. This distinction is one between absorption and immersion.
The mode of absorption is one in which the spectator goes into the
film – that is, is absorbed in or by the film – whereas in the mode of
immersion the film comes out to the spectator so as to surround and
envelop her/him. These are different kinds of movement – one in which
the spectator is drawn into the film, and an opposite one whereby the film
comes out towards the spectator – and each offers a significantly
different mode of engagement. Absorption is a term used most famously
in recent times by the art historian Michael Fried. Fried utilizes the
12 See Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology
and Ideological State
Apparatuses (notes toward an
investigation)’, in Lenin and
Philosophy, and Other Essays,
trans. Ben Brewster (London:
Verso, 1971), pp. 85–132.
13 Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari,
What is Philosophy?, trans.
Graham Burchell and Hugh
Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994),
p. 164.
14 Deleuze, Cinema 2: the Time-
Image, p. 169.
15 Deleuze and Guattari, What is
Philosophy?, p. 164.
















notion of absorption in order to denote the mode of address central to the
history and conception of modernist painting. The term, for Fried, means
something like the depiction of a world from which the viewer is
excluded but whose effect and success relies on the viewer believing or
imagining that she/he is in fact included in that depiction of a world. If
this term can be made useful for describing a certain kind of cinematic
engagement (as I have argued elsewhere16), then perhaps the absorptive
experience can be reduced to offering the feeling that while watching a
film, ‘you are there’, while simultaneously producing the
acknowledgment that ‘you cannot be there’.
Immersion is something rather different. Instead of feeling, as with
absorption, that you are entering the film, with immersion comes the
sensation that the film is entering your own space, perhaps even that it is
entering your own body.17 This way of conceiving of film has become a
very popular mode of contemporary theorizing, whether one is writing of
expanded cinema, new media, high octane blockbuster cinema, horror or
‘body genre’ cinema or even, it must be added, Deleuzian conceptions of
cinematic engagement. Much has been made of Deleuze’s notions of
affect and the affection-image, for the definition he gathers from Henri
Bergson states that affect is ‘that part or aspect of the inside of my body
which we mix with the image of external bodies’.18 Most commentators
seem to have taken this to mean that for affection, external bodies come
out towards me so as to mix with my own body. They have thus equated
Deleuze’s conception of affect with what I am here calling immersion.
One might perhaps more fruitfully conceive of such affective
participation in an absorptive way; that is, in terms of the way that a body
can be imaginarily projected into the image. This is the direction in
which I prefer to take Deleuze’s analyses. I tend to feel that Fried’s
formulations on absorption can take us a long way towards understanding
the position Deleuze occupies. For example, at one point in his book
Courbet’s Realism, Fried discusses the extraordinary canvas The
Wheat-Sifters (figure 1). He convincingly argues that the figures in the
painting are in some sense surrogates for those viewing the painting, but
also that the two sifters who are engaged in the activity of sifting are not
there merely to represent those people and those actions. In other words,
they are not merely there to be looked at. Rather, Fried claims that the
type of engagement a viewer has with this painting and with these figures
is ‘no longer one of beholding but a mode of identification in which
vision as such is all but elided’.19 This is one of the astonishing aspects of
absorption: not merely that one can be looking in on another world, but
also that one can have the sensation of bodily occupying that space in
another world, the sensation of occupying the space of another being. To
put it bluntly, one of the possibilities which absorption holds forth is the
possibility of being another being.
Another art historian, T.J. Clark, has recently tried to call this ‘the
moment of otherness’ in Courbet’s paintings: ‘the moment of otherness
and matter-of-factness, of objectivity and self-loss’.20 What absorption
16 Richard Rushton, ‘Early, classical
and modern cinema’, Screen, vol.
45, no. 3 (2004), pp. 226–44.
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Press, 2003); Ron Burnett, How
Images Think (Cambridge, MA:
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and Andrea Zapp (eds), New
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Institute, 2002); Oliver Grau (ed.),
MediaArtHistories (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2007).
18 Henri Bergson, Matter and
Memory, trans. Nancy M. Paul
and W. Scott Palmer (New York,
NY: Zone Books, 1988), p. 58.
19 Michael Fried, Courbet’s Realism
(Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1990), p. 153.
20 T.J. Clark, ‘The special motion of
a hand: Courbet and Poussin at
the Met’, London Review of
Books, 24 April 2008, p. 6.
















encourages in the beholder is a sensation that one is no longer oneself,
that one has lost one’s selfhood in order to become something other, that
one has lost the coordinates by which one’s subjectivity can be defined in
order to occupy a position that is in some sense objective rather than
subjective (I become an object rather than a subject might be one way to
think of it).
Absorption, I would argue, goes some way towards describing
Deleuze’s approach to cinema spectatorship. For him, cinema is a matter
of placing oneself where one is not, of becoming someone or something
one is not. That is, cinema, for Deleuze, offers the possibility of
becoming other than what one is, of being someone (or something) else.
Immersion is somewhat different from absorption. Instead of the
promise of becoming other which is offered by absorption, immersion
offers only the option of remaining firmly within the bounds of one’s own
selfhood. A mode of immersion is one where the film comes to me so as
to attract me, arouse me, solicit me; and it can do so only on the basis of
an agreement or contract – it can canvass me only insofar as an accord is
struck and consent agreed. At all times the immersive situation is one
which is provided for me and whose defining presence is to make me part
of its raison d’eˆtre. In other words, if it is immersive, the film is there for
me; not to offer the possibility of my becoming something or someone
else, but to offer only the affirmation of the me that is me. (What I am
calling immersion is roughly equivalent to what Fried calls theatricality
in the history of art.21)
The trajectory of Laura Mulvey’s work offers an interesting case here,
for she moves from the (in)famous active–male/passive–female split of
1975’s ‘Visual pleasure’ article through to a dazzling kaleidoscope of
Gustave Courbet (1819–77), Les
Cribleuses de ble´/The Wheat-
Sifters (1853–54). Nautes, Muse´e
des Beaux-Arts. (C) RMN /&
Ge´rard Blot.
21 See Michael Fried, ‘Art and
objecthood’, in Art and
Objecthood: Essays and Reviews
(Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 148–
72; Absorption and Theatricality:
Painting and Beholder in the Age
of Diderot (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1980). I should
stress that immersion is a term I
am using in my own way, for
Fried often uses ‘absorption’ and
‘immersion’ interchangeably.
See, for example, his short essay
on Douglas Gordon and Philippe
Parreno’s 2006 film, Zidane: a
21st Century Portrait, ‘Absorbed
in the action’, Artforum, vol. 45,
no. 1 (2006), pp. 333–5, 398.
















spectatorial terms in her most recent work: a deciphering spectator, a
pensive spectator, a possessive spectator, an alert spectator – any kind of
spectator, it seems, so long as this spectator is doing things and is not in
any way passive. Even more important, perhaps, in Mulvey’s recent
Death 24 x a Second,22 is the sense of an historical shift, a belief that up
until the 1970s the grounding of the cinematic experience in a theatrical
setting – of spectators in a theatre – facilitated modes of spectatorship
that were inherently passive, whereas contemporary technologies –
video and DVD – break apart the confines of that necessary passivity and
give the viewer a freedom to navigate, interact and engage with cinema’s
images in an entirely active manner.
What the evolution of Mulvey’s work entails is none other than a move
from theorizing Brechtian distanciation and alienation to theorizing
something approaching immersion.23 For today – the main example of
this occurs in her account of Sirk’s Imitation of Life (1959) – analysis has
moved from a Brechtian consideration of Sirkian melodramatic
distanciation where, significantly, it was the structures and ruptures of
the film’s unfolding text that were central, to a point where the text itself
becomes a plaything of the remote control. Now it is no longer necessary
for the film itself to provide the ruptures and fissures of form, but instead
it is the remote control which manipulates the DVD and which thus gives
the viewer access to the intricacies of Sirk’s subversive formal efforts.
For Mulvey, it is now the actions, interactions and button-pushings of the
spectator that offer ways of radicalizing filmic texts. The remote control,
the pause and rewind of the DVD, offer the spectator the opportunity to
halt any film – to ‘delay’ cinema, as Mulvey calls it – so that such films
can be subject to the spectator’s mastery: the film can thus be
reconfigured by me in such a way as to be for me. With the DVD, as
Mulvey manipulates it, and in the mode that I am here calling immersion,
any film loses its autonomy, it loses its separation from me, it loses its
challenge to me, and merely becomes an object for me.
Federico Fellini foresaw this evolution nearly twenty-five years ago in
a cynically damning jibe at the conveniences of the television remote
control. The point he wished to make is that, with modes of reception like
immersion or interactivity, the cinema will no longer be able to offer any
challenges to spectators. Any challenges can be instantly dismissed,
obliterated, so that that the sanctity of any viewing subject will not be
ruffled.
. . . how can one not consider that device which, by pressing a button,
shows you forty films, one after another? Television, violence, the fear
of thinking, of facing reality. How can one make a family leave their
house? Father is in his underwear, the wife is in her slip, the children
are sprawled on the sofa or on the floor, all in front of the television
which provides them with films of every kind, the whole of cinema
from its birth to the present day. What’s more, there’s the exaltation
that pressing a button gives them, feeling that they are controlling the
22 Laura Mulvey, Death 24 x a
Second: Stillness and the Moving
Image (London: Reaktion Books,
2006).
23 Laura Mulvey, ‘Notes on Sirk and
melodrama’, in Visual and Other
Pleasures (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1989),
pp. 39–44; and ‘Delaying
cinema’, in Death 24 x a Second,
pp. 144–60.
















world. Bergman has always intimidated them? Oh well, they press a
button and cancel him, annul him. Antonioni has always made them
uneasy? Well, they press a button and get rid of him. It is a deliverance
from any kind of frustration, a celebration of the most brutal collective
vendetta.24
If writers are keen to promote immersion and a push-button realm of
interactivity, then what they are desiring is a filmic object that will
answer their own fantasies, fantasies that can only ever be drawn in their
own image. Immersion is a certain refusal to go outside of oneself, a
refusal of ecstasy, a denial of the possibility of becoming other; an
attitude of maintaining the certainty of one’s own thoughts and refusing
the invitation to think another’s thoughts or to experience another’s
sensations. One might consider this as a refusal of passivity: with
immersion one must insist on one’s self remaining active, in control, in
order that one remain a self-certain self, reflexively, reflectively,
endlessly folding back onto the oneness of a self.
In an intellectual environment where the dominant mode of theorizing
a spectator’s or reader’s relation to a film, text or artwork has been all
about defining and maintaining levels of self-control over what one sees
and experiences – for Screen Theory as much as for cultural studies,
whether one begins with Brecht, Barthes or Stuart Hall – Deleuze throws
down a quite extraordinary and risky challenge: that we lose control of
ourselves, undo ourselves, forget ourselves while in front of the cinema
screen. Only then will we be able to loosen the shackles of our existing
subjectivities and open ourselves up to other ways of experiencing and
knowing. Of course, this is by no means a tactic free of peril – one can be
as much absorbed by Triumph of the Will (Leni Riefenstahl, 1935) as by
Sans soleil (Chris Marker, 1983); and films can deliver to us the brains of
idiots as much as it can deliver the brains of inspiration or genius.25 That,
however, for Deleuze, is a challenge we should be willing to face.
24 Federico Fellini, ‘The cinema is
finished. But The Ship Sails On
(interview)’, in Costanzo
Costantini (ed.), Fellini on Fellini
(London: Faber and Faber, 1994),
p. 124.
25 Deleuze writes that ‘The screen,
that is ourselves, can be the
deficient brain of an idiot as
easily as a creative brain’.
Deleuze, ‘The brain is the
screen’, p. 366.
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